TY - JOUR
T1 - Compensation consultants and executive pay
T2 - evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom
AU - Conyon, Martin J.
AU - Peck, Simon I.
AU - Sadler, Graham V.
PY - 2009/2/1
Y1 - 2009/2/1
N2 - Executive Overview Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts. Copyright by the Academy of Management.
AB - Executive Overview Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts. Copyright by the Academy of Management.
KW - executive compensation
KW - business consultants
KW - cheif executive officers
KW - employee fringe benefits
UR - http://amp.aom.org/content/23/1/43.abstract
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=65349117701&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002
DO - 10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:65349117701
SN - 1558-9080
VL - 23
SP - 43
EP - 55
JO - Academy of Management Perspectives
JF - Academy of Management Perspectives
IS - 1
ER -