Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of CEO employment risk from a corporate governance (CG) perspective. Previous studies focused on the effect of CG on firm performance, we investigate the effect of CG on CEO’s employment risk. Using Probit model on a panel dataset from UK FTSE 350 non-financial companies, our results reveals that the likelihood of CEO employment risk increases as board size and board independence increases, while CEO network reduces the likelihood. The study advances CG literature by providing fresh insights into how CG mechanisms can enhance effective monitoring of CEO performance. It also offers important insight to policy makers who are interested in providing guidance on the optimal board size and board composition and those interested in the effective monitoring of CEO performance and organisational strategies for firm performance.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | European Accounting Association Conference Proceedings |
Publication status | Published - 10 May 2017 |
Event | 40th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association - Valencia, Spain Duration: 10 May 2017 → 12 May 2017 |
Conference
Conference | 40th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association |
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Abbreviated title | EAA 2017 |
Country/Territory | Spain |
City | Valencia |
Period | 10/05/17 → 12/05/17 |