Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on CEO Employment Risk

Cecilia Olukemi Yekini, M. O. Oscar-Chidioke, Emmanuel Adegbite

Research output: Chapter in Book/Published conference outputConference publication

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of CEO employment risk from a corporate governance (CG) perspective. Previous studies focused on the effect of CG on firm performance, we investigate the effect of CG on CEO’s employment risk. Using Probit model on a panel dataset from UK FTSE 350 non-financial companies, our results reveals that the likelihood of CEO employment risk increases as board size and board independence increases, while CEO network reduces the likelihood. The study advances CG literature by providing fresh insights into how CG mechanisms can enhance effective monitoring of CEO performance. It also offers important insight to policy makers who are interested in providing guidance on the optimal board size and board composition and those interested in the effective monitoring of CEO performance and organisational strategies for firm performance.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEuropean Accounting Association Conference Proceedings
Publication statusPublished - 10 May 2017
Event40th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association - Valencia, Spain
Duration: 10 May 201712 May 2017

Conference

Conference40th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association
Abbreviated titleEAA 2017
Country/TerritorySpain
CityValencia
Period10/05/1712/05/17

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