TY - JOUR
T1 - Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
AU - Chaudhry, Sajid M.
AU - Kleimeier, Stefanie
N1 - © 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
PY - 2015/9/1
Y1 - 2015/9/1
N2 - This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrower and syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
AB - This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrower and syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
UR - https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1042443115000748
U2 - 10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021
DO - 10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021
M3 - Article
SN - 1042-4431
VL - 38
SP - 116
EP - 126
JO - Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
JF - Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
ER -