Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

Robert A. Nash; Kimberley A. Wade; Maryanne Garry; Elizabeth F. Loftus; James Ost

doi:10.1002/acp.3265

Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

Robert A. Nash^*, Kimberley A. Wade, Maryanne Garry, Elizabeth F. Loftus, James Ost

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Letter, comment/opinion or interview › peer-review

Abstract

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	31–33
Number of pages	3
Journal	Applied Cognitive Psychology
Volume	31
Issue number	1
Early online date	14 Oct 2016
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3265
Publication status	Published - Jan 2017

Bibliographical note

© 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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10.1002/acp.3265Licence: CC BY 3.0

Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories
© 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Final published version, 60.4 KBLicence: CC BY 3.0

Cite this

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title = "Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories",

abstract = "Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.",

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AU - Nash, Robert A.

AU - Wade, Kimberley A.

AU - Garry, Maryanne

AU - Loftus, Elizabeth F.

AU - Ost, James

N1 - © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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N2 - Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

AB - Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

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Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

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