@techreport{bf43dad9ea6f4fa99d1f61130c0b7cc5,
title = "Raising rivals' fixed costs",
abstract = "This paper analyses the strategic use of fixed costs to deter entry or monopolize a market in a standard Cournot framework. First of all a general case shows how the presence of fixed costs can affect the possible equilibria to the Cournot game. It is shown that the presence of a firm with a first-mover advantage can have important implications if fixed costs are raised. In addition the forward induction process becomes important in determining plausible equilibria. The use of firstly regulation and secondly {\textquoteleft}nuisance{\textquoteright} law-suits are considered as strategies to increase fixed costs.",
keywords = "fixed cost, raising rivals{\textquoteright} costs, entry deterrence, monopolization, regulation, nuisance law-suits",
author = "Matthew Olczak",
year = "2005",
month = jan,
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.891051",
language = "English",
series = "CCP working paper",
publisher = "University of East Anglia",
number = "05-1",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of East Anglia",
}